Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience,9781405108386

Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

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Edition: 1st
ISBN13: 9781405108386
ISBN10: 140510838X
Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 2003-04-18
Publisher(s): Wiley-Blackwell
List Price: $66.40

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Summary

In this work, two distinguished figures from neuroscience and philosophy present a detailed critical survey of the philosophical foundations of cognitive neuroscience.

Author Biography

M. R. Bennett AO is Professor of Physiology and University Chair at the University of Sydney. He is the author of many papers and books in neuroscience, including The Idea of Consciousness (1997) and A History of the Synapse (2001). He is President of the International Society for Autonomic Neuroscience, Past President of the Australian Neuroscience Society, and the recipient of numerous awards for his research in neuroscience, including the Neuroscience Medal, the Ramaciotti Medal and the Macfarlane Burnet Medal.

P. M. S. Hacker is a Fellow of St John’s College, Oxford. He is the author of numerous books and articles on philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, and the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Among his many publications is the monumental five-volume Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, and its epilogue Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy, published by Blackwell (first two volumes co-authored with G. P. Baker).

Table of Contents

Foreword xiii
Acknowledgements xvii
Introduction 1(8)
Part I Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots
9(100)
The Early Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System
11(32)
Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: The Origins of the Ventricular Doctrine
12(11)
Fernel and Descartes: The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine
23(7)
The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and its Aftermath
30(3)
The Concept of a Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall
33(5)
Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig
38(3)
The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sherrington
41(2)
The Cortex and the Mind in the Work of Sherrington and his Proteges
43(25)
Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact
43(4)
Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism
47(2)
John Eccles and the `Liaison Brain'
49(8)
Wilder Penfield and the `Highest Brain Mechanism'
57(11)
The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience
68(41)
Mereological Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience (Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Damasio, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird)
68(6)
Methodological Qualms (Ullman, Blakemore, Zeki, Young, Milner, Squire and Kandel, Marr, Frisby, Sperry)
74(7)
On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to a Being
81(4)
On the Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity (Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick)
85(3)
The Inner (Damasio)
88(2)
Introspection (Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz)
90(2)
Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect (Blakemore)
92(2)
Privacy or Subjectivity (Searle)
94(3)
The Meaning of Psychological Predicates and How they are Learnt
97(6)
Of the Mind and its Nature (Gazzaniga, Doty)
103(6)
Part II Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis
109(2)
Preliminaries
111(126)
Brain--Body Dualism
111(3)
The Project
114(3)
The Category of the Psychological
117(4)
Sensation and Perception
121(27)
Sensation (Searle, Libet, Geldard and Sherrick)
121(4)
Perception (Crick)
125(23)
Perception as the causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities (Kandel, Schwartz and Jessell, Rock)
128(7)
Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz (Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young)
135(2)
Visual images and the binding problem (Sherrington, Damasio, Edelman, Crick, Kandel and Wurtz, Gray and Singer, Barlow)
137(6)
Perception as information processing: Marr's theory of vision (Marr, Frisby, Crick, Ullman)
143(5)
The Cognitive Powers
148(24)
Knowledge and its Kinship with Ability
148(6)
Being able to and Knowing how to
149(2)
Possessing Knowledge and Containing Knowledge (LeDoux, Young, Zeki, Blakemore, Crick, Gazzaniga)
151(3)
Memory (Milner Squire and Kandel)
154(18)
Declarative and non-declarative memory (Milner, Squire and Kandel)
155(3)
Storage, retention and memory traces (LeDoux, Squire and Kandel; Gazzaniga, Mangun and Ivry; James, Kohler, Glynn; Bennett Gibson, and Robinson; Damasio)
158(14)
The Cogitative Powers
172(27)
Belief (Crick)
172(3)
Thinking
175(5)
Imagination and Mental Images (Blakemore, Posner and Raichle, Shepard)
180(19)
The logical features of mental imagery (Galton, Richardson, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Finke, Luria, Shepard, Meudell, Betts, Marks, Shepard and Metzler, Cooper and Shepard, Posner and Raichle)
187(12)
Emotion
199(25)
Affections (Rolls, Damasio)
199(4)
The Emotions: A Preliminary Analytical Survey
203(21)
Neuroscientists' confusions (LeDoux, Damasio, James)
207(9)
Analysis of the emotions
216(8)
Volition and Voluntary Movement
224(13)
Volition
224(4)
Libet's Theory of Voluntary Movement (Libet, Frith et al.)
228(3)
Taking Stock
231(6)
Part III Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis
237(116)
Intransitive and Transitive Consciousness
239(22)
Consciousness and the Brain (Albright, Jessell, Kandel and Posner, Edelman and Tononi; Glynn, Greenfield, Llinas, Gazzaniga, Searle, Johnson-Laird, Chalmers, Dennett, Gregory, Crick and Koch, Frisby)
239(5)
Intransitive Consciousness (Searle, Dennett)
244(4)
Transitive Consciousness and its Forms
248(5)
Transitive Consciousness: A Partial Analysis
253(8)
Conscious Experience, Mental States and Qualia
261(32)
Extending the Concept of Consciousness (Libet, Baars, Crick, Edelman, Searle, Chalmers)
261(2)
Conscious Experience and Conscious Mental States
263(8)
Confusions regarding unconscious belief and unconscious activities of the brain (Searle, Baars)
268(3)
Qualia (Searle, Chalmers, Glynn, Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Nagel, Dennett)
271(22)
`How it feels' to have an experience (Searle, Edelman and Tononi, Chalmers)
274(3)
Of there being something which it is like . . . (Nagel)
277(4)
The qualitative character of experience
281(1)
Thises and thuses (Chalmers, Crick)
282(2)
Of the communicability and describability of qualia (Nagel, Edelman, Glynn, Sperry)
284(9)
Puzzles about Consciousness
293(30)
A Budget of Puzzles
293(1)
On Reconciling Consciousness or Subjectivity with our Conception of an Objective Reality (Searle, Chalmers, Dennett, Penrose)
294(8)
On the Question of how Physical Processes can give rise to Conscious Experience (Huxley, Tyndall, Humphrey, Glynn, Edelman, Damasio)
302(5)
Of the Evolutionary Value of Consciousness (Chalmers, Barlow, Penrose, Humphrey, Searle)
307(7)
The Problem of Awareness (Johnson-Laird, Blakemore)
314(2)
Other Minds and Other Animals (Crick, Edelman, Weiskrantz, Baars)
316(7)
Self-Consciousness
323(30)
Self-Consciousness and the Self
323(1)
Historical Stage Setting: Descartes, Locke, Hume and James
324(4)
Current Scientific and Neuroscientific Reflections on the Nature of Self-Consciousness (Damasio, Edelman, Humphrey, Blakemore, Johnson-Laird)
328(3)
The Illusion of a `Self' (Damasio, Humphrey, Blakemore)
331(3)
The Horizon of Thought, Will and Affection
334(12)
Thought and language (Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Galton, Penrose)
337(9)
Self-Consciousness (Edelman, Penrose)
346(7)
Part IV On Method
353(58)
Reductionism
355(23)
Ontological and Explanatory Reductionism (Crick, Blakemore)
355(11)
Reduction by Elimination (P. M. and P. S. Churchland)
366(12)
Are our ordinary psychological concepts theoretical? (P. M. Churchland)
367(3)
Are everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory? (P. M. Churchland)
370(2)
Eliminating all that is human (P. M. and P. S. Churchland, Dawkins)
372(4)
Sawing off the branch on which one sits
376(2)
Methodological Reflections
378(33)
Linguistic Inertia and Conceptual Innovation (P. S. Churchland)
379(7)
The `Poverty of English' Argument (Blakemore)
386(2)
From Nonsense to Sense: The Proper Description of the Results of Commissurotomy (Crick, Sperry, Gazzaniga, Wolford Miller and Gazzaniga, Doty)
388(8)
The case of blind-sight: misdescription and illusory explanation (Weiskrantz)
393(3)
Philosophy and Neuroscience (Glynn, Edelman, Edelman and Tononi, Crick, Zeki)
396(12)
What philosophy can and what it cannot do
399(6)
What neuroscience can and what it cannot do (Crick, Edelman, Zeki)
405(3)
Why it Matters
408(3)
Appendices
411(42)
Appendix 1 Daniel Dennett
413(23)
1 Dennett's Methodology and Presuppositions
415(4)
2 The Intentional Stance
419(8)
3 Heterophenomenological Method
427(4)
4 Consciousness
431(5)
Appendix 2 John Searle
436(17)
1 Philosophy and Science
436(7)
2 Searle's Philosophy of Mind
443(6)
3 The Traditional Mind-Body Problem
449(4)
Index 453

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